The Slovak Intelligence Service’s 2023 report fails to confront the extensive foreign interference tactics employed by Russia and China, many of which are well-known and documented. These include the cultivation of influencers, media figures, and both high-level and mid-level policymakers to promote foreign-aligned narratives, as well as the dissemination of pro-Russian propaganda through local media and think tanks. Despite the pervasive nature of these challenges, the report dedicates only 138 words to the subject, offering vague and superficial commentary. By failing to deliver a transparent and detailed analysis of foreign interference, the intelligence agency deprives Slovak citizens of the critical information needed to hold policymakers accountable and foster public debate. This omission undermines the core purpose of an annual public intelligence report: to bolster Slovakia’s resilience against evolving grey-zone challenges and safeguard its democratic fabric.
The Slovak Intelligence Service’s annual report provides only a limited and narrowly focused analysis of the hybrid threats posed by Russia and China, particularly when compared with the detailed and transparent assessments issued by intelligence agencies in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The comparison is relevant given that these Nordic countries have pioneered the concept of total defence, integrating societal resilience with national security. Their reports are lauded for their breadth, granularity, and public accountability, offering a useful benchmark for a frontline EU and NATO state like Slovakia. Although the Slovak report officially covers the year 2023, concerns identified within it persist into 2024, during which the same government continues to influence the intelligence service’s approach. This continuity allows for a meaningful comparison and highlights the persistent gaps in addressing hybrid threats.
In stark contrast, the Slovak report acknowledges hybrid threats but fails to present a similarly comprehensive and nuanced view of this broader landscape. While it mentions select aspects—like disinformation, occasionally cyber aggression, or isolated attempts at political and economic penetration—its tone remains guarded and lacking in specifics. There is little substantive engagement with the full array of political warfare tools that Russia and China routinely employ.
For example, nowhere does the report thoroughly address issues such as the deliberate targeting and cultivation of individuals in policymaking roles below the top political level, where foreign states can shape narratives and policy from within; covert or semi-covert funding and/or support provided by foreign actors to academic institutions, NGOs, cultural organisations, or religious communities, aimed at molding Slovakia’s policy environment in line with external interests; strategic economic influence—investment in sectors that may not appear critical at first glance but, over time, create dependencies or decision-making constraints favourable to a foreign power; the co-opting of local influencers, social media personalities, or pseudo-experts who serve as conduits for foreign-friendly narratives, undermining societal cohesion, or Russian proxies running media outlets and think tanks that subtly shift public discourse. The section of the report dedicated to hybrid threats spans roughly a quarter page and consists of about 138 words—this, despite the fact that most of these hybrid tactics have been publicly documented in Slovakia over the past decade.
Documented Patterns of Foreign Interference
In a country deeply impacted by Russian grey-zone warfare, one would reasonably expect its intelligence service to raise the alarm; raising awareness of evolving threats is a key purpose of any yearly intelligence report. However, the Slovak Intelligence Service’s annual report, which covers activities during 2023, fails to account for the depth and breadth of Russian hybrid tactics that continue to shape Slovakia’s political and diplomatic landscape. For example, developments in 2024, such as Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár’s repeated meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—more frequent than with any other counterpart—signal a troubling diplomatic realignment at odds with broader EU and NATO priorities.
Furthermore, the reorganisation of Slovakia’s diplomatic corps, replacing experienced pro-Western staff with individuals educated at Russian institutions, highlights structural vulnerabilities that are neither new nor confined to a single year. Yet, the intelligence report neglects to address how these trends, long observed and well-documented, fit into a broader pattern of hybrid interference that spans both 2023 and beyond.
The report similarly omits a closer examination of covert and semi-covert activities that have long shaped Slovakia’s policymaking environment. Publicly accessible analyses and media reports reveal that cultural organisations, think tanks, and NGOs with alleged ties to Russian interests have been operating in Slovakia for years, subtly influencing public discourse. Over the past decade, the cultivation of pro-Russian media outlets has further amplified Kremlin-aligned narratives, shaping the public debate in ways that align with foreign interests.
Additionally, the economic dimension of hybrid threats receives inadequate attention in the Slovak Intelligence Service’s report. While covering activities in 2023, the report neglects to analyse how energy dependencies and strategic investments can be weaponised to influence national policies. For instance, public reports from 2024 indicate a continuing reluctance among Slovak officials to scale back Russian involvement in the energy sector, despite EU efforts to reduce reliance on Kremlin-controlled supplies. Economy Minister Denisa Saková’s openly documented visits to negotiate gas deals with Russian Gazprom further underscore this vulnerability. These developments, while occurring outside the reporting year, are indicative of long-standing trends that the Slovak intelligence assessment fails to fully address.
The purpose of the annual intelligence report is to provide transparency to the broader political opposition, the media, and, most importantly, the public. By failing to adequately discuss these issues, the Slovak Intelligence Service denies the public the critical information needed to understand emerging threats and demand effective action from their political representatives.
In doing so, the report undermines its role as a tool for fostering accountability and resilience in the face of growing hybrid challenges; by providing a more transparent and nuanced account of foreign interference, the intelligence service could help shape public debate and empower voters, interest groups, and other stakeholders to hold policymakers accountable, thereby bolstering Slovakia’s resilience against evolving grey-zone challenges.
Author: Victor Breiner
