A Russian electronics supplier with verified contracts to the Federal Security Service (FSB)—Russia’s domestic intelligence agency—relocated its operations to Slovakia after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, raising serious questions about European Union enforcement of sanctions and internal security oversight. Mirelix, a Saint Petersburg-based company that provided dual-use components likely suitable for missile guidance systems, including to FSB Unit 45187 described by defence analyst Vladimír Bednár as one of Russia’s most secretive divisions, remained active in Russian state procurement after its owners registered business operations and acquired property near Bratislava. Investigative findings by the Slovak watchdog Ján Kuciak Investigative Centre suggest the firm signed additional contracts with Russian military-linked units post-invasion, though it remains unverified whether deliveries were fulfilled from EU territory. The Slovak Information Service declined to comment on potential breaches of national security, while the Czech Republic’s Security Information Service warned that similar business entities are frequently used as covert covers for Russian intelligence. Despite falling revenues, Mirelix’s continued activity, coupled with broader regional evidence of Western microchips reaching sanctioned Russian forces, underscores growing concern over ineffective export controls and the vulnerability of European jurisdictions to foreign intelligence operations embedded in legitimate commercial networks.
In the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a Russian company with prior links to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to have relocated key operations to Slovakia. Publicly available information suggests that this firm, known as Mirelix and originally based in Saint Petersburg, may have continued supplying sensitive electronic components to Russian military and intelligence units after the outbreak of war. The case raises concerns about potential violations of international sanctions and poses broader questions about security risks and foreign intelligence activities operating within the European Union.
Mirelix has previously secured contracts with multiple Russian state institutions, including some of the country’s most secretive intelligence and military units. According to official Russian procurement databases, its most prominent client was FSB Unit 45187, identified by military analyst Vladimír Bednár as one of the intelligence service’s most covert branches. The company’s supplies included silicon generators and radiocomponents—technologies with recognised dual-use potential, meaning they may serve both civilian and military functions. Bednár has stated that these components are likely to be integral to missile guidance systems, including those used in ballistic and cruise missile programmes.
Following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, the couple behind Mirelix, Igor and Maria Trojanovski, reportedly moved from Russia to Slovakia. Public records show that Igor Trojanovski registered as a sole trader in Slovakia two months after the invasion began and later acquired property near the capital, Bratislava. However, it remains unknown when the couple arrived in the country or under what circumstances they obtained residency status. The Slovak Ministry of the Interior declined to provide this information, citing personal data protection laws.
From Saint Petersburg to Bratislava: How a Russian Military Contractor Crossed Borders
The investigative team from the Ján Kuciak Investigative Centre (ICJK), an independent Slovak media watchdog, identified evidence suggesting that contracts between Mirelix and FSB units were signed after the invasion had already commenced. These contracts, reportedly involving advanced electronic components such as power supplies and silicon-based devices, raise questions about whether the firm violated EU sanctions prohibiting military-related exports to Russia. ICJK was unable to confirm whether these contracts were fulfilled from within Slovakia or elsewhere in the European Union. Mirelix did not respond to multiple attempts for comment, either at their registered Slovak address or through official contact details.
Mirelix’s history of cooperation with Russian military and intelligence structures extends beyond the FSB’s Unit 45187. Other clients included FSB Unit 45185, which has been associated with acquiring high-precision machinery for missile component production. Bednár noted that this unit is believed to be responsible for producing cruise missiles such as the Kh-101, used in attacks against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. The company also supplied timing devices to FSB Unit 52015, which, according to Bednár, oversees the development and maintenance of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal and holds a higher position in the national security hierarchy than Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU).
Despite the relocation of Mirelix’s leadership, the company remains operational in Russia. Accounting records from recent years show a decline in revenue but continued activity. In 2022, the firm’s reported income was over 12 million rubles (approximately €154,000), dropping to just over 6 million rubles (under €54,000) the following year. These figures suggest reduced but ongoing participation in Russia’s state contracting system.
The possible use of commercial fronts by Russian intelligence services to obscure their activities is a longstanding concern for European security agencies. The Czech Republic’s Security Information Service (BIS) has repeatedly highlighted the threat posed by individuals and businesses linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex operating in Central Europe. BIS spokesperson Ladislav Šticha explained that intelligence operations are often disguised under seemingly legitimate professions such as journalism, commerce, or entrepreneurship. According to Šticha, such activities represent a persistent and significant security risk to the region.
Whether Mirelix continued supplying Russian state units after relocating to Slovakia is currently unknown. The Slovak Information Service, the country’s domestic intelligence agency, did not respond to inquiries from journalists before the article’s publication deadline. Similarly, the company’s representatives have not clarified whether deliveries were made from within Slovakia or whether existing contracts were fulfilled using alternative suppliers or routes.
Military and security experts emphasise the challenges posed by dual-use technologies, especially in sectors where civilian components may serve military purposes. Matej Kandrík, Director of the Slovak think tank Adapt Institute, stated that the non-lethal nature of such equipment complicates enforcement, making sanctions circumvention a profitable and increasingly common practice. According to Kandrík, the global demand for advanced components has fostered illicit networks that exploit complex financial mechanisms, falsified product origins, and third-country intermediaries to continue supplying Russia’s defence sector.
According to findings published by investigative platform The Insider in 2023, Russia’s military units have acquired Western technologies, including American-made microchips, despite sanctions. These components, often routed through importers like Mirelix, are critical to the functionality of modern weaponry. This has prompted further scrutiny of the effectiveness of existing sanctions regimes and raised alarms over the vulnerability of European markets to exploitation by foreign intelligence services.
The full extent of Mirelix’s operations in Slovakia and the implications for national and regional security remain unclear. However, the case has drawn attention to the risks posed by insufficient oversight of foreign-linked firms with prior involvement in sensitive military supply chains. It also underscores the challenges facing democratic governments and investigative institutions in enforcing accountability while navigating legal constraints on transparency.
Source: Karin Kőváry Sólymos | ICJK.SK
