Only 14 percent of Slovaks say they would take up arms to defend their country in the event of a Russian invasion—an extraordinary signal of societal disarmament at a time of heightened regional threat, deepening Kremlin influence, and growing doubts about the credibility of Slovakia’s commitment to NATO’s collective defence. The figure, drawn from an April 2025 poll conducted by the independent agency Focus for the platform 360tka.sk, reveals a nation where rhetorical support for defence vastly outpaces personal commitment to resistance. While nearly three-quarters of respondents stated that Slovakia should be defended, the overwhelming majority rejected the idea of participating in that defence themselves.
The refusal to fight is not evenly distributed: voters of Prime Minister Robert Fico’s Smer-SD, of Hlas-SD—led by President Peter Pellegrini and chaired by Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok—and of the neo-Nazi Republika party, whose European Parliament members Milan Uhrík and Milan Mazurek are known Kremlin allies, show markedly low readiness to resist. In Republika’s case, 29 percent of its voters would not resist a Russian attack at all. The poll’s findings emerge amid intensified monitoring of Russian disinformation in Slovakia, where EU security bodies have identified systematic influence operations targeting public opinion, weakening institutional trust, and undermining NATO cohesion. With the war in Ukraine ongoing and Poland reinforcing defence preparedness, Slovakia’s apparent apathy to national defence raises urgent questions about its internal resilience and the vulnerability of NATO’s eastern frontier.
Slovakia has registered a stark drop in the number of citizens willing to take up arms in defence of the country in the event of a Russian invasion. According to a public opinion survey conducted in April 2025 by the polling agency Focus for the independent news platform 360tka.sk, only 14 percent of respondents said they would be willing to fight with a weapon. This figure represents a sharp decline from a comparable survey in July 2024, when 25 percent of Slovaks declared readiness to fight, as recorded by a poll conducted by Ipsos for the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO).
The discrepancy between the two polls, less than a year apart, suggests that public determination to offer armed resistance has eroded significantly. In the April 2025 poll, nearly three out of five Slovaks stated that while they would not take up arms, they still believe Slovakia should be defended. Around one in eight respondents rejected any form of resistance altogether.
NATO’s Article 5 commitment hinges not only on political declarations but on the credible willingness of each member to contribute to collective defence. A member state where only 14 percent of the population is willing to defend its own territory presents a functional weakness in the alliance. Slovakia borders Ukraine, hosts NATO infrastructure, and lies on critical logistical corridors for eastern flank operations. Its geographic position implies strategic utility, but its internal defence posture suggests strategic fragility. Low public willingness to fight undermines deterrence, complicates mobilisation planning, and signals to adversaries that allied resolve may fracture under pressure. In a collective defence scenario, alliance cohesion depends on both military readiness and societal resilience—Slovakia currently shows a strategic deficit in both.
Slovakia Won’t Fight: A Nation Paralysed Before the First Shot
The Focus–360tka.sk survey also highlighted substantial variation in attitudes across political affiliations. Among voters of Smer-SD—a party led by Slovakia’s current Prime Minister Robert Fico—only 9 percent said they would fight. A majority of 59 percent would not engage in combat but still supported the principle of national defence, while 19 percent stated they would not resist a Russian invasion at all.
Among voters of Hlas-SD, the party of current Slovak President Peter Pellegrini and chaired by Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok, the willingness to fight was even lower. Just 7 percent of respondents identifying with Hlas said they would take up arms. Seventy-two percent said they would not fight but still supported national defence, and 7 percent expressed opposition to any form of resistance.
Particularly striking were the findings among supporters of the far-right Republika movement, widely described as neo-Nazi and explicitly pro-Kremlin. The party is represented in the European Parliament by Milan Uhrík and Milan Mazurek, both of whom are known figures in Brussels due to their extremist positions. Among Republika voters, only 9 percent expressed willingness to fight, 46 percent would support non-combat resistance, and a staggering 29 percent would not resist a Russian attack under any circumstances.
The Focus poll also broke down willingness to fight by demographic and regional categories. Younger Slovaks, particularly those aged 18 to 24, showed the highest inclination to take up arms. This willingness declined significantly among respondents aged 35 to 44. Those with university-level education and higher household incomes were more likely to support armed resistance, with the most pronounced willingness found in the Trnava and Prešov regions. The lowest levels were recorded in Banská Bystrica.
Russian Propaganda Works: Slovaks Are Choosing Surrender
Ethnic and occupational profiles further revealed deep divides. Ethnic Slovaks expressed more willingness to fight than ethnic Hungarians. Meanwhile, manual labourers and entrepreneurs reported the highest levels of readiness to defend the country with a weapon.
The exceptionally low figure of 14 percent of Slovaks willing to take up arms in defence of their country must be viewed within the broader context of sustained Russian information manipulation and interference in Slovakia, which has been well documented by both Slovak and international security bodies. According to the European External Action Service (EEAS) StratCom Task Force, Slovakia ranks among the most exposed EU member states to pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives, particularly those portraying NATO as a threat, Ukraine as a failed state, and Russia as a misunderstood peace-seeking actor. Reports by Globsec and the Centre for Democracy & Resilience further confirm that Slovakia exhibits the highest susceptibility to pro-Russian narratives in Central Europe, with roughly 50 percent of Slovaks in 2023 believing that the West, not Russia, was responsible for provoking the war in Ukraine.
Such narratives are amplified through a dense network of local disinformation actors, often posing as alternative media, as well as through political figures and parties sympathetic to the Kremlin, including Republika and, to a more ambiguous extent, Smer-SD. The dramatic decline from 25 to 14 percent in the willingness to fight may therefore not merely reflect war fatigue or pacifism, but rather a corrosive effect of long-term exposure to foreign information operations, designed to erode trust in national institutions, Western alliances, and the legitimacy of collective defence. This aligns with Russia’s strategic objectives: to weaken NATO’s eastern flank not through tanks, but by undermining the political and psychological will of its member states.
When contrasted with attitudes in neighbouring Poland, Slovakia’s reluctance stands out even more. A Polish survey conducted by the IBRiS agency for the daily Rzeczpospolita found that while one-third of Poles would flee their homes in case of war, about 10 percent would join the military and 25 percent would volunteer for humanitarian or medical support. Although Polish society also shows signs of war fatigue, the willingness to resist militarily has not plummeted as dramatically.
Victory? Defeat? Slovaks Want Peace—Even on Putin’s Terms
This is not the first time public opinion in Slovakia has been closely linked to perceptions of the war in Ukraine. The 2024 Ipsos–CEDMO survey indicated that 39 percent of Slovaks preferred a scenario in which the war ended in a “temporary peace without a victor.” Only a third supported a Ukrainian victory, while 14 percent hoped for a Russian win. Among supporters of the ruling Smer party, that figure reached 35 percent; among Republika voters, 34 percent. Just 5 percent of Hlas supporters expressed the same view.
Taken together, these findings present a sobering image of a society where rhetorical commitment to national defence is undermined by a widespread unwillingness to act. They also reflect a broader scepticism—among significant segments of the population—toward Ukraine’s fight for survival, and by extension, Slovakia’s own strategic interests.
Author: Victor Breiner | Slovak Media Monitor
