
Slovakia has become a frontline enabler of Kremlin influence within the European Union, as Prime Minister Robert Fico—long aligned with Russian President Vladimir Putin—cemented his pro-Moscow stance by attending Russia’s May 2025 Victory Day parade as the sole EU leader present. According to Slovak political analyst Grigorij Mesežnikov, this public endorsement of the Kremlin’s wartime narrative is not an isolated provocation but the culmination of Fico’s consistent ideological alignment with authoritarian regimes, his government’s open support for neo-Nazi figures like Daniel Bombic, and sustained efforts to dismantle judicial independence. While citing anti-fascist motives, Fico’s domestic record is contradicted by political alliances that embolden far-right actors and amplify Kremlin-backed disinformation, with analysts identifying his rhetoric as a central conduit for Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy in Slovakia. The result, Mesežnikov warns, is a member state drifting from democratic norms and weakening EU and NATO cohesion from within.
Robert Fico’s appearance alongside Vladimir Putin at Moscow’s Victory Day parade—while Russia intensifies its war on Ukraine—marked a stark departure from the European consensus. According to political analyst Grigorij Mesežnikov, the Slovak prime minister’s presence was not about commemorating history, but about legitimising a regime he has long admired.
Mesežnikov identifies Fico as a consistent and sincere supporter of Russia and its political model. Shaped during the socialist era, Fico internalised favourable assessments of the Soviet Union. His public statements, including recent remarks to the Russian daily Izvestiya, reflect Soviet-era narratives and reveal what Mesežnikov describes as hostility—if not hatred—towards Ukraine. Fico has backed proposals by Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that analysts believe aim to force Ukraine into capitulation. In Mesežnikov’s view, Fico systematically supports positions harmful to Ukraine, often ignoring Russia’s direct responsibility for mass civilian casualties.
While Fico claims his Moscow visit honoured fallen Soviet soldiers, Mesežnikov challenges this, pointing to his domestic alliances with neo-Nazi sympathisers. Daniel Bombic—a Holocaust denier and convicted extremist—has received overt political support from Fico’s Smer-SD party, including from the Government Office. Mesežnikov sees this as incompatible with genuine anti-fascism and calls Fico’s rhetoric a cover for political alignment with the Kremlin.
That alignment extends to Slovakia’s legal and political institutions. According to Mesežnikov, the government is attempting to dismantle judicial independence to shield extremist allies like Bombic. Courts and prosecutors issuing justified decisions face public attacks from Fico and his coalition partners, undermining the rule of law.
In foreign policy, Mesežnikov describes Fico’s stance toward the EU as transactional. Although Slovakia has received €38 billion from EU funds, Fico discusses the EU only in financial terms, rarely acknowledging shared values or responsibilities. While claiming to conduct diplomacy “in all four directions,” Fico aligns with authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, and Vietnam. He appeared at the Moscow parade with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, underscoring this geopolitical orientation.
Despite publicly halting military aid to Ukraine, Fico’s government continues to export record amounts of ammunition there. Mesežnikov notes this contradiction reveals a dual strategy: ideological support for Russia, balanced by pragmatic economic engagement with Ukraine.
Mesežnikov characterises Slovakia as a “laboratory” for Russian hybrid warfare. Since 2014, domestic political elites have been the key agents of this influence, with Smer-SD, the Slovak National Party (SNS), and far-right movements actively pushing pro-Kremlin narratives. One such actor is Prosecutor General Maroš Žilinka, who compared Slovakia’s 2022 defence agreement with the United States to the Soviet occupation treaty of 1968—a claim Mesežnikov calls shocking. Žilinka also visited Moscow to mark the 300th anniversary of Russia’s prosecutorial system, meeting with sanctioned official Igor Krasnov.
Fico’s pro-Russian network includes SNS leader Andrej Danko, former police chief and current parliamentary deputy speaker Tibor Gašpar, and MEP Milan Uhrík, who votes against EU resolutions critical of Russia. These political figures benefit from a sprawling disinformation ecosystem, including the platform Infovojna, which amplifies Kremlin messaging. Despite this, Fico claims he has no media support—a claim Mesežnikov flatly contradicts.
Public support for Ukraine has eroded. Mesežnikov cites polls showing only 30 percent of Slovaks back Ukraine, while around half are undecided or neutral. He attributes this shift to fear, economic pressures, and coordinated disinformation, often reinforced by the government itself.
Strategic communication structures that once defended democratic discourse have been dismantled. Mesežnikov describes today’s system as a mere caricature. The Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), he notes, is now led by the son of a SMER official who shares office infrastructure and ideological leanings with the party. SIS participated in promoting the government’s narrative of an alleged coup attempt—an operation Mesežnikov compares to textbook Russian hybrid tactics.
President Peter Pellegrini, recently elected with support from the self-described “peace camp,” illustrates what Mesežnikov calls political ambiguity. Though Pellegrini has acknowledged Russian aggression abroad, he has not visited Ukraine and has avoided criticising Fico’s foreign policy. His public solidarity with Fico during recent tensions with Kyiv further illustrates his alignment.
Mesežnikov notes Slovakia is increasingly isolated within NATO and the EU, no longer invited to key security summits. Fico rejects initiatives like the French-led nuclear defence umbrella, signalling a broader divergence from Europe’s collective security framework.
In Mesežnikov’s analysis, Fico’s supposed anti-fascist agenda is discredited by his alliances with extremist figures and his silence on Russian atrocities. His Moscow visit, far from honouring history, reflects a consistent pro-Kremlin ideology that, according to Mesežnikov, undermines democracy, security, and Slovakia’s credibility on the international stage.
Source: Mirek Tóda | Denník N