A Security Threat in Poland, a Businessman in Slovakia

A Russian businessman sanctioned by Poland for his ties to a major state-linked chemical producer continued operating in Slovakia with legal residency and unrestricted mobility across the European Union, raising questions about gaps in enforcement of international sanctions within the EU’s eastern member states. Oleg Fedorchenko, identified by Polish authorities in 2023 as the beneficial owner of Nitro Chemical and former shareholder in Russia’s Schekinoazot—an industrial conglomerate sanctioned by Ukraine and linked through state financing to the Russian military sector—retained Slovak residency at two addresses and transferred ownership of a Slovak firm while travelling freely within the EU.

According to reporting by Slovak outlet Aktuality.sk and Infosecurity.sk, his Slovak-based company, Nitro Trading, imported Russian methanol into the EU market and reached €96.5 million in turnover prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Despite the imposition of comprehensive Polish sanctions—freezing assets, banning procurement access, and designating him as a threat to national security—no equivalent action was taken by Slovak authorities. The Slovak Ministry of Finance, responsible for implementing such measures, did not respond to requests for comment. The case underscores concerns about regulatory inconsistencies across EU states, which analysts say continue to enable sanctioned individuals to exploit legal and logistical loopholes for commercial gain amid heightened geopolitical and security risks stemming from Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Oleg Fedorchenko, a Russian businessman with longstanding ties to the sanctioned Russian chemical conglomerate Schekinoazot, maintained business activities and legal residency in Slovakia while already subject to Polish government sanctions. According to public records and reporting by Slovak investigative outlet Aktuality.sk, Fedorchenko utilised Slovak residency status to facilitate cross-border operations involving the chemical trade, despite escalating sanctions related to the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine.

Schekinoazot, based in Russia’s Tula region, is one of the country’s largest producers of industrial chemicals, including methanol. The company was sanctioned by Ukraine in 2021 for its reported support of the Russian regime, but it has not been subject to direct sanctions by the European Union or the United States. According to a December 2024 investigative report by Reuters, Russian chemical firms tied to oligarchs have supplied critical materials for explosives production used by the Russian military. Due to its output scale and close ties to Russian state financing—through institutions such as VEB.RF and Gazprombank—Schekinoazot is described in that report as strategically important to Russia’s defence sector.

Polish authorities included Fedorchenko on their national sanctions list in 2023, citing his role as the chairman of the board and beneficial owner of the Polish firm Nitro Chemical. This company specialises in trading chemical substances, particularly methanol. Documents also link Fedorchenko to the Russian company OOO Nauchno-Innovatsionnaia Kompania Schekinoazot, where he served as founder and shareholder between 2007 and 2018. Despite these connections, Fedorchenko retained a Slovak residence permit, granting him mobility within the European Union even after the imposition of Polish sanctions.

Records obtained by Aktuality.sk indicate that Fedorchenko held Slovak residency at two addresses—one in the city of Žilina and another in the municipality of Malinovo near Bratislava, the Slovak capital. Based on this residency, which functions similarly to an identity card for foreign nationals, Fedorchenko was able to travel freely within EU territory. Evidence suggests he took advantage of this status; for example, when formally transferring ownership of his Slovak company to a Slovak citizen named Marián Šmárik, the documentation was signed and verified at the Slovak consulate in Varna, Bulgaria. Attempts to reach Šmárik or representatives of Nitro Trading for comment were unsuccessful, according to the report.

Fedorchenko’s Slovak company, Nitro Trading, bore a name similar to its Polish counterpart. According to Slovak financial statements, Nitro Trading reached its peak revenue in 2018, with an annual turnover of €96.5 million. The company’s primary activity involved importing technical methanol from Russia and transporting it through Ukraine—later rerouted via Belarus and Poland—into the European Union. The chemical is primarily used in fertiliser production. While financial records confirm the volume of trade, it is unclear whether Nitro Trading maintained physical operations in Slovakia or served as a formal entity for cross-border logistics. This remains “Unknown,” as noted by Aktuality.sk.

Publicly available data show that the majority of methanol managed by Nitro Trading was distributed to other EU member states rather than retained for use in Slovakia. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the tightening of EU sanctions, Nitro Trading’s revenues declined significantly. From nearly €7 million in 2023, reported income fell to just €22,400 in 2024—a drop of nearly 100 percent. This decline corresponds with broader sanctions enforcement against Russian chemical exports.

According to Slovakia’s commercial register, Fedorchenko was the sole owner of Nitro Trading, though the firm was originally established by the Russian conglomerate Schekinoazot. The registry now lists Marián Šmárik as the only partner, but other official databases still identify Fedorchenko as the actual owner. This inconsistency has not been formally clarified.

While the Polish government imposed a set of restrictive measures against Fedorchenko—freezing all financial and economic assets, banning access to public funds and procurement, and designating him as an unwelcome foreign national—no similar action has been taken by Slovak authorities. The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, which oversees sanctions implementation, did not respond to questions submitted by Aktuality.sk before publication.

This case follows a broader trend documented in Slovakia and other Central European states, where sanctioned individuals from the Russian Federation have held legal residency or conducted business activities. Previous reporting by Aktuality.sk has highlighted such issues in its investigative series “In the Shadow of Sanctions.”

Similar patterns of sanctions circumvention have been identified elsewhere. In 2023, the Czech investigative portal Investigace.cz reported that the Belarusian company Grodno Azot, also under sanctions, exported urea-based fertilisers to the Czech Republic and Poland using falsified documentation and shell companies. According to Jiří Skuhrovec, an analyst at the Czech data firm Datlab, such practices will remain common “as long as it is possible to obscure the origin of goods and the ownership structures of the companies trading them.”

Author: Peter Sabo | Aktuality.sk | Infosecurity.sk